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DYNAMIC FEDERALISM AND WIND FARM SITING

H. Brendan Burke
An "all-of-the-above" energy policy has led to the emergence
of wind power as an energy resource of choice. But despite their
considerable environmental and economic advantages, wind
energy systems do have drawbacks. Among these, the mechanical
and electromagneticproperties of wind turbines encroach on U.S.
Department of Defense ("DoD') military installations and
activities. These encroachment concerns, including interference
with air traffic control and other radar systems, create tension
between national security and the development of renewable
energy sources. Because utility siting decisions are made at the
state and local level, the federal government's ability to guard
against encroachment by wind farms is limited to advisory
determinations issued by the FederalAviation Administration.
In 2013, North Carolina enacted a statute requiring
consultation with DoD officials as a prerequisite to applying for
and issuing a wind farm permit. This statute effectively allows the
DoD to prevent the state from issuing such a permit. This Article
explores wind farm siting law in general and explains how North
Carolina'slaw empowers the DoD in this regard. The Article also
analyzes whether it is advisablefor a state to yield such authority
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to a federal government agency and considers whether it is
appropriatefor the DoD to exert this level of influence over the
state permittingprocess.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Concerns about climate change and energy security have
fundamentally changed the electric utility landscape in the United
States. Policymakers charged with selecting energy resources face
difficult decisions affecting competing interests. Just as fossil fuels
and nuclear reactors come with social and ecological price tags that
many observers believe make them unsustainable as sources of
utility power, renewable energy sources each bring economic,
environmental, and other burdens along with their benefits. Wind
energy conversion systems are no exception.
Wind power systems use elevated turbines to capture
mechanical energy from the wind to generate electricity.' In utility
applications, the turbines are grouped together in large facilities
commonly known as "wind farms." 2 Because wind is a free "fuel,"
wind farms (once they are constructed and operational) are
considered reliable, low-cost hedges against fluctuating fossil fuel
prices. 3 But the great advantage of wind farms over fossil-fuel
power plants is that wind turbines emit no greenhouse gases.4
According to the American Wind Energy Association, for every
megawatt-hour of electricity generated by a wind facility rather

' AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, Wind 101: The Basics of Wind Energy,
http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber-900&navltemNum
ber-587 (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). Wind turbine technology will be described
more fully in the next section of this article. See infra notes 36-50 and
accompanying text.
2See, e.g., WORLD WIND ENERGY ASS'N, WIND ENERGY - Technology and
Planning, http://wwindea.org/technology/ch02/estructura-en.htm (last visited
Mar. 7, 2014). For the purpose of this article, the term "wind farm" refers to any
utility scale wind energy generation facility.
AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, The Cost of Wind Energy in the U.S.,
http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ltemNumber-5547 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2014).
4 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, Wind Energy & Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, http://awea.rd.net/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber-5097 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2014).
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than a fossil-fuel power plant, 1,300 fewer pounds of carbon
dioxide ("C0 2") are released into the atmosphere.5 This results in a
reduction of 3,500 metric tons of CO 2 per single turbine every
year.6 In 2013, the collective reduction credited to all U.S. wind
farms totaled ninety-six million metric tons-as much CO 2 as
sixteen million automobiles would emit in a year. 7 Wind turbines
also use and discharge essentially no water-a distinct advantage
over fossil-fuel and nuclear plants, which require vast amounts of
water for cooling.8 No water used, no water polluted.9
Wind energy systems do have drawbacks, however. While
wind is free, it is not constant.'o When the wind is not blowing, the
rotors do not turn, and the turbines do not generate power." Given
the technology presently available, excess electricity that wind
turbines generate when the wind is blowing cannot be stored costeffectively for later transmission and distribution. 12 Utility
companies cannot then rely exclusively on wind and must
supplement wind farms' output with other resources, generally
conventional fuels. 13 Additionally, the startup costs for wind

5

6 Id

Id

7Id These figures represent a 3.6% reduction in CO 2 emissions from the
utility power industry across all fuel sources. Id.
8 AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, supra note 1.
9 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC Soc'Y, Wind Power Information, Wind Power Facts,
http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/windpower-profile/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
1o Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and
Wind: A New Frameworkfor Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1049, 1061-62 (2009).
1 3 ALTERNATIVE ENERGY 326 (Neil Schlager & Jayne Weisblatt eds., 2006)
(providing an equation for the relationship between wind energy available and
wind speed where if wind speed is zero no energy is generated).
12 Eric Jelinski, The Inconvenient Truth about Wind Turbines, http://www.
windturbinesyndrome.com/2012/the-inconvenient-truth-about-wind-turbines-froman-engineer-canadal (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
13Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 10, at 1062.
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facilities are high, 14 especially given the need for redundant generation
capacity. Transmission costs are also high, because geographic
locales suitable for wind farms are often far from population
centers. 15 There is no consensus that wind energy is economically
viable in the long term.' 6
Wind energy also has environmental drawbacks. Utility-scale
wind farms require large swaths of usually pristine land or water.
Outdoors enthusiasts, adjacent landowners, and other parties
interested in such areas often consider the turbines to be
eyesores.' 8 Neighbors complain about the noise from the turbines
and the flicker effect caused by the sun shining through the
rotating blades.19 The turbines can interfere with television and
radio reception.2 0 Wind farms are known to kill birds and bats. 2'

14 ExploringGreenTechnology.com, Wind Energy Facts, http://exploringgreen
technology.com/wind-energy/wind-energy-facts/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). One
wind energy opponent asserts that per megawatt ("MW"), wind facilities require
five times or more the amount of construction material than is required to build a
nuclear plant. Jelinski, supra note 12.
15See 3 ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, supra note 11, at 321.

16 See, e.g., Wind Energy Pros and Cons, http://energyinformative.org/windenergy-pros-and-cons/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (noting that "[t]he costcompetitiveness of wind power is highly debatable").
173 ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, supra note 11, at 321.
Id. at 321-22.
at 331.
'Id.
20
Id. at 332.
21 NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COLLABORATIVE, WIND TURBINE INTERACTIONS
WITH BIRDS, BATS, AND THEIR HABITATS: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS

AND PRIORITY QUESTIONS 2 (2010), available at http://wwwl.eere.energy.
gov/wind/pdfs/birds andbats_fact sheet.pdf. See also R. Kyle Evans, Recent

Development, Wind Turbines and Migratory Birds: Avoiding a Collision
Between the Energy Industry and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 15 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. ON. 32, 46-49 (2014), available at http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/Evans_final.pdf (explaining in detail the risks that wind turbines pose
to birds and describing the case of California's Altamont Pass Wind Resource
Area, a wind farm known to have caused over 4,000 avian kills annually).
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These fatalities result from collision as well as habitat and behavior
disruptions.2 2
The mechanical and electromagnetic properties of wind
turbines (which will be explored in detail in the next section of this
Article) 23 pose significant hazards and complications to DoD
military installations and activities.24 These encroachment25 concerns,
many of which also pose problems for civil aviation,2 6 include
interference with air traffic control and other radar systems. 27 One
ramification of these hazards and complications is the very real
potential for conflict between the public's requirement for national
security and its interest in developing renewable energy sources to
protect the environment and achieve energy independence.
Despite these drawbacks and the various disputes about its
relative merits, wind energy figures very prominently in U.S.
energy policy. President Barack Obama described that policy in
March 2012: "We can't have an energy strategy for the last century

22 NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COLLABORATIVE, supra note 21.
23 Infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
24 See generally OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, U.S. DEP'T
OF DEF., THE EFFECT OF WINDMILL FARMS ON MILITARY READINESS (2006),

available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/library/Congressional%20Report%
20Impact%20of%2OWind%2OTurbines%202006%20AFRL.pdf (reporting the
findings of a 2006 DoD study "on the effects of wind farms on air defense and
missile warning radars and the resulting potential impact on military readiness").
25 "Encroachment" refers to "[i]ncompatible development surrounding military
installations that threatens the ability to carry out the training [or] testing
mission." U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., & ASS'N OF FISH &
WILDLIFE AGENCIES, DoD NATURAL RESOURCE PROGRAMS & INRMP
IMPLEMENTATION: ENCROACHMENT slide 5-2 (2009), available at http://www.

dodworkshops.org/files/Training/SikesModules/Mod5_Encroachment_FINAL
july09_1_.pdf.
26

See generally AIRSPACE & SAFETY INITIATIVE WINDFARM WORKING GROUP,
MANAGING THE IMPACT OF WIND TURBINES ON AVIATION 10-24 (2013),

available at http://airspacesafety.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/20130701
ManagingThelmpactOfWindTurbinesOnAviation ScriptFINAL_V1.pdf (surveying
wind turbine effects on aviation).
27 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note
24, at 26-41.
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that traps us in the past. We need an energy strategy for the
future-an all-of-the-above strategy for the twenty-first century
that develops every source of American-made energy."28
But electric utility siting decisions are made at the state and
local level, so this national policy is implemented on an ad hoc
basis.29 Regarding hazards to civil and military aviation and other
military activities, the federal government's ability to protect its
interests is limited to advisory determinations issued by the Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA").3 0
In 2013, North Carolina enacted a statute3 1 requiring early and
frequent consultation with DoD officials as a prerequisite to
applying for or issuing permits to construct wind farms. 32 This
article will explain how this statute operates to effectively allow
the DoD-a federal agency33 with no independent federal authority
to influence wind siting actions-to prevent the state from issuing
a wind farm construction or expansion permit.3 4
Part II of this Article examines the physical characteristics of
wind turbines and explains how they affect air traffic control and
military activities. Part III discusses the development of electricity

The White House, Energy, New Report: The All-of the-Above Energy
Strategy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/05/29/new-report-all-above-energystrategy-path-sustainable-economic-growth (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
29 See infra notes 118-53 and accompanying
text.
30 See infra notes 158-87 and accompanying text.
3' 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 51 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.115
(2013)).
32 See infra notes 230-68 and accompanying text.
3 The term "agency" is subject to varying connotations with a breadth of
specificity, but is used broadly here and is not intended to convey any specific
28

adjudicative authority or other distinct status. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 63

(7th ed. 1999) (defining "agency" as "[a] department or other instrumentality of
the executive branch of the federal government . . ."). See also Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (defining "agency" to include "each
authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or
subject to review by another agency . . .").
34 See infra notes 248-68 and accompanying text.
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generation regulation in the United States, including a survey of
how wind farm siting regimes vary among the states. Part IV
addresses the ways in which the federal government, with special
emphasis on the FAA and the DoD, can influence state wind farm
siting actions to protect aviation and military interests. Part V
explores the recent North Carolina statute and explains how it
could allow the DoD to effectively prevent the state from issuing a
wind farm construction permit. Part VI analyzes whether it is
advisable for a state to grant this type of soft veto3 5 to a federal
government agency. Part VII considers whether it is appropriate
for the DoD to exert this level of influence over the state
permitting process. Part VIII argues that the North Carolina law
can serve as a model for other states with installed or potential
wind energy capacity and significant military presence.
II. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before considering the relationship between wind energy
facility siting and military operations, it is necessary first to
understand the physical characteristics of wind turbines and how
they operate, how radar systems operate, and how wind turbines
affect radar and other military aviation systems.
Wind turbines evolved from windmills, which have been in use
for over a millennium.36 The earliest windmills, originating in the
Middle East and spreading to Europe, were used to mill or grind
wheat and other grains. 37 Europeans later adopted the technology
for other purposes, such as using the mechanical energy captured
by the rotating sails to reclaim wetlands by pumping water away

The term "veto" describes the "power of one governmental branch to
prohibit an action by another branch ..... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1558
(2014). The term "soft veto" in this article represents the author's
conceptualizing the DoD's ability to influence a state wind facility permit
decision, especially in the negative.
36

PAUL A. LYNN, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY: AN INTRODUCTION

9(2011).
37

id.
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from low ground.3 8 Windmills were ubiquitous until the industrial
revolution, when steam power, electric motors, and internal
combustion provided more reliable sources of mechanical power,
not subject to variations of wind direction and speed.3 9
But the advent of utility electric power did not signal the end
for wind energy. The turn of the twentieth century saw the
development of turbines designed to use wind-powered rotors to
turn dynamos that generated electricity for local use, transmission,
or storage in batteries.40 Wind turbine technology languished to
some extent, however, because of the assumption that fossil fuels
and nuclear power would serve the world's energy needs
indefinitely. 4 1 It was not until the 1970s-when faced with the
confluence of a burgeoning environmental movement and the
reality of limited oil supplies subject to political and other societal
instability-that the United States and other nations began in
earnest to develop wind turbines for electricity generation at the
utility scale. 42
The typical wind turbine today uses a three-bladed design on a
horizontal axis. 43 Blades can vary from thirty-four to fifty-five
meters in length, depending on the turbine's generation capacity.44
The rotor is mounted to a nacelle or housing situated atop a
tower. 45 Utility-scale turbines (those rated 100 kilowatts or higher)
in the United States have towers ranging from 80 to 100 meters
tall. 46 A height of 100 meters is fairly typical for a 2-megawatt

Id. at 9- 10.
1d. at 12-13.
40
Id. at 13.
39

41

42

Id.

1d. at 13-15.
43
Id. at 15.
44 AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, Anatomy of a Wind Turbine, http://awea.rd.net/
Resources/Content.aspx?ltemNumber-5083&RDtoken=29819&userlD=43 79
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
45
LYNN, supra note 36, at 15.
46
AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, supra note 1.
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("MW") wind turbine,4 7 which is about the average output for
turbines installed in the United States. 4 8 Taking the rotor diameter
into consideration, then, an average U.S. wind turbine's total
height would be approximately 114 meters (374 feet) to 155 meters
(509 feet).
For onshore installations, the towers are mounted on concrete
foundations or secured to existing rock formations using long steel
rods.49 Offshore turbines are either secured to the sea floor with
pilings, built into gravity foundations that sit on the bottom, or set
to float on the surface while tethered or anchored to the bottom.o
Of particular concern to the DoD is the effect that these
towering vertical structures have on radar systems that serve its
installations and training and operating areas.5 1 Radar 52 systems
use radio signals to remotely measure location, velocity, and
shapes of objects.5 3 The basic principle involves a transmitter that
emits a pulse of radio energy into the atmosphere. 54 When the
radio signal contacts an object (such as a cloud, mountain,
airplane, wind turbine, or any other "target"), some or all of the
signal is reflected back in the direction from which it originated. 5
A receiver or scanning antenna, which may be located with or

47 LYNN, supra note 36, at 66.
48 Am. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, supra
note
49 LYNN, supra note

44.

36, at 98.

sold. at 162-66.
5' See generally OFFICE OF THE DIR.

OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G,

supra note

24.

Although its usage has evolved to that of a common noun or common
adjective, the term "radar" is an acronym dating from World War 11 meaning
"radio detecting and ranging." THE FACTS ON FILE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORD
AND PHRASE ORIGINS 604 (Robert Hendrickson ed., 3d ed. 2004) (emphasis in
original).
14 How IT WORKS - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1893 (3d ed. 2003).
54
Id. at 1894-95.
5
Id. at 1894.
52
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separate from the transmitter, detects the returning pulse of radio
energy. 56 This arrangement is depicted in Figure 1.
Reflected Energy
Target

Antenna
Radar
Electronics
Processor__________

Transmitted Energy
Display

Figure 1 - Basic radar system operation5 7
By analyzing the time elapsed from transmission until the
receipt of the returned pulse, the system ascertains the distance the
pulse traveled and, therefore, the distance from the station to the
object. 58 Because many radar antennae rotate 360 degrees, by
accounting for angular position the system can determine the
azimuth or direction from the station to the target object.59
Similarly, an antenna rotating on a horizontal axis or designed with
other advanced properties can also determine an object's altitude. 6 0
The foregoing description pertains to systems known as
primary surveillance radar ("PSR"). 6 1 Besides relying on PSR, air-

56

id.

Image reproduced from OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G,
supra note 24, at 11 fig.2.
58 14 How IT WORKS - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 53, at 1894.
5

59 Id.
60

Id. at 1895.

61 Id.

at 1897. See also OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH
& ENG'G,

supra note 24, at 17 (discussing PSR).
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traffic control organizations employ secondary surveillance radar
("SSR") systems.62 For an SSR system, the target object (usually
an aircraft) is equipped with a transponder-a device that transmits
a radio signal to supplement the reflected pulse with amplifying
information such as identitv, flight number, and altitude as
measured within the aircraft.6 Federal aviation regulations require
that aircraft operating in the busiest classes of airspace be equipped
with transponders.64 PSR and SSR image returns combine to give
air controllers a real-time, four-dimensional representation of the
airspace for which they are charged to route aircraft and maintain
65
separation.
The accuracy-and therefore utility-of either type of radar
system relies on the strength of the returned signals. 66 A number of
factors can decrease signal strength, such as increased distance,
decreased target size, atmospheric conditions, and intervening
physical objects-whether natural or man-made. 67 Objects like
hills or buildings can block transmitted radar energy outright,
resulting in the system's inability to detect a desired target (such as
an aircraft) in the intervening object's radar "shadow." 68 Figure 2
depicts the radar shadow effect.

HOw IT WORKS - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 53, at 1897.
Id.
64 14 C.F.R. § 91.215(b) (2014).
65 Raytheon Co., Air Traffic Control Wind Farm Interference Mitigation
at
Raytheon, Technology Today (2012), available at http://www.raytheon.com/
62
63

newsroom/technologytoday/archive/2012 i2.pdf.
66 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24, at
11.
6
1 d. at 10.
6
1Id. at 13.
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Antenna

Figure 2 - Radar signal blockage 69
Even if the intervening object does not altogether block a radar
signal, its size or shape may cause the signal to diffract and
weaken. 70 These shadowing effects and diffractions (depicted in
Figure 3) contribute to unwanted return that operators call
"clutter."7 1 Radar clutter and signal weakness detract from the
system's ability to detect intended targets, differentiate between
objects close to one another, and accurately measure objects'

movement. 72

69

Image reproduced from id at 14 fig.5.

Id. at 13-14.
n Id. at 11. "Clutter" is "any unwanted reflected signal that enters the radar

7o

receiver and can interfere with the determination of the desired attributes of the
target of interest." Id.
72 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24,
at 11.
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Interference

IWavea
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Wind Turbnes

IRadar Pulse

Figure 3 - Radar signal diffraction 73
PSR systems rely heavily on Doppler frequency shift to locate
and track air targets.7 4 put simply, Doppler frequency shift refers to
the change in the returned radio wave frequency due to the changes
in the relative distance between the station and the target. For a
stationary radar site and a stationary target, or when the distance
between both is otherwise unchanging, the frequency of the
reflected return signal should be roughly the same as the
transmitted signal.7 If the target is moving closer to the station, the
frequency of the returned signal "shifts" slightly higher. 77
Likewise, if the target is moving away from the station, the return

Image reproduced from id. at 14 fig.6.
74 Raytheon Co., supra note 65, at 28.
7

" OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24, at 16.
76

Id.

77

id.
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frequency is slightly lower. 78 The magnitude of the shift indicates
the relative speed of the target.7 9
Rotating wind turbine blades display Doppler frequency shifts
similar or identical to those associated with moving aircraft.80 This
is one of the primary challenges that wind farms pose if they are
situated near airport approach or departure patterns or under
low-altitude military air training areas. To a radar operator, "a
wind turbine looks like a real aircraft . . . .82 The operator may
track a false target, delete a real target, or move a real target to an
incorrect position because of the faulty information displayed. 83 In
2008, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
characterized the problem as follows:
Because each wind turbine has a radar "signature approximately that of
a jumbo jet," the wind farm "could likely appear as a fleet of jumbo
jets" on the radar screen and confuse air traffic controllers. In addition,
the turbines could intermittently disappear from the screen and reappear
a few seconds later-hampering "the ability of the air traffic controller
to successfully control aircraft in the area." 84

Further, in some cases air traffic controllers have mistaken
radar returns from large wind farms to be adverse weather

1798 Id. at

16-17.
1d. at 17.
s0 Raytheon Co., supra note 65, at 28.
1

See id.

Id. At peak generating efficiency, turbine blade tips spin at 78-158 knots
(nautical miles per hour), a speed similar to that exhibited by a helicopter or
light airplane. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24,
at 28. The spinning blades themselves present a radar cross section as big as or
larger than such aircraft. Id.
8 Raytheon Co., supra note 65, at 28.
84 Clark County, Nev., v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 522 F.3d 437,
442 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (quoting an expert study offered by petitioner). The proposed wind farm
in question, to be located a few miles from a planned airport near Las Vegas,
Nev., was to include 83 turbines that were 400 feet high. Id. at 438.
82

16
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conditions. At least one radar manufacturer characterizes wind
turbines' effect on air traffic control systems as "severe." 86
Radar applications are not limited to the air traffic control
context. 87 Other uses include air defense, missile warning, and
weather detection. 88 Obstructional interference and clutter can
degrade the performance of all these radar applications. 8 9 For
example, the lowest point of a radar signal transmitted 15
kilometers from a missile defense early warning radar is
approximately 510 feet above the ground, 90 virtually the same
height as a typical utility-scale wind turbine as discussed above. 9 1
In 1994, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence ("MoD")
launched a series of studies into wind farms' effects on radar
system.92 Importantly, and unexpectedly, a 2004 trial demonstrated
that PSR ability to track and detect aircraft was degraded even if
the aircraft were flying at an altitude as high as 2,000 feet above
ground level (approximately four or more times the height of
typical turbines). 93 Besides the inability to effectively track
different types of aircraft used in the trial, several false contacts
were reported at all altitudes. 94 Later MoD trials confirmed these

85See generally Felix A. Losco & Thomas F. Collick, When Wind, Wind
Turbines, and Radar Mix-A Case Study, 68 A.F. L. REV. 235 (2012) (detailing
radar interference observed by air traffic controllers at Travis Air Force Base,
Calif., caused by a 700-turbine wind farm).
86 See generally Raytheon Co., supra note 65 (describing air traffic control
problems resulting from wind turbine farms).
81 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note
24, at 15.
88

id.

" Id. at 16.
90
Id at 20 tbl.3.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
92
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24, at 33-36.
9
3Id. at 33.
94
Id. at 34.
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findings. 9 5 The degradations were attributed to shadowing and
diffraction caused by the wind turbines.9 6
To supplement the data accrued in the U.K. trials, the DoD
conducted tests in Tyler, Minnesota, in 2004.97 The results were
consistent with the MoD's.9 8 The Tyler results also suggested that
in adverse weather conditions, wind farm-induced radar capability
degradations occurred over a larger geographic area-even beyond
the limits of the wind farm itself.99
While the studies discussed above focused on land-based wind
energy systems, offshore wind turbines present the same radar
interference issues that onshore systems pose. 00 Offshore wind
energy facilities also bring additional challenges.1or For example, a
2013 study determined that marine surface-search radars could
have difficulty tracking vessels in or near wind farms. 102
Industry and government stakeholders have achieved limited
success mitigating wind-turbine-induced radar interference. 103

95
Id.
96

at 35.

Id. at 36.

9 Id. at 38. Earlier U.S. testing (at King Mountain, Texas, in 2002) had
suggested that wind farm effects on air traffic control radar were minimal, but
the methodology of those tests were later determined to be deficient. Id. at 36-37.
Specifically, the low number of flights performed and the profiles of the flights
(altitude and distance from radar station) resulted in biased results. Id. at 37.
98 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24, at 39-40.
99
Id. at 40.
100 Samuel D. Perkins & Melanie A. Everett, Offshore Wind Strategy Rollout:
FAQs, in OFFSHORE WIND POWER: CHALLENGES, ECONOMICS AND BENEFITS
227, 231 (Samuel D. Perkins & Melanie A. Everett eds. 2011).
'1 See generally HAO LING ET AL., FINAL REPORT DE-EE0005380 - ASSESSMENT

OF OFFSHORE WIND FARM EFFECTS ON SEA SURFACE, SUBSURFACE AND
AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS (2013), availableat http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/

wind/pdfs/assessment offshore wind effects onelectronic systems.pdf (reporting
the results of a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy ("DoE")
regarding offshore wind turbine effects on electronic systems).
102 Id. at vii.
103 Nat'I Renewable Energy Lab., Large-Scale Offshore
Wind Power in the
United States: Assessment of Opportunities and Barriers, in OFFSHORE WIND
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Measures implemented on the radar side include hardware and
software upgrades and installing "gap-filling" radar stations to
cover the wind farms' radar shadows.' 04 Regarding the turbines
themselves, manufacturers have applied "stealth" coatings to the
exterior of the rotor blades. 0 5 But these measures have not proven
to be panaceas, especially considering their increased costs and
engineering requirements.' 0 6
Radar interference is not the only way that wind turbines can
affect military operations. 107 As is the case with most large
electromechanical machinery, wind turbines have distinct
electromagnetic signatures. 08 This unintended effect on the
electromagnetic spectrum in the area around a wind farm can
interfere with communications gear, surveillance systems, and
offensive and defensive electronic warfare equipment.109 Further,
offshore turbines can interfere with underwater acoustic detection
systems. 110

Setting aside the risks associated with radar and other
electromagnetic interference, wind turbines and wind farms also
pose a far less technologically abstruse hazard to aviation-the risk
of collision by low-flying aircraft."' Air traffic approaching and

163 (Samuel D. Perkins &
Melanie
A. Everett eds. 2011).
04
1 Id. The "gap-filling" radar sites serve "to fill in for radar coverage that may
be lost due to wind farm clutter." Perkins & Everett, supra note 100, at 231.
105 Id.
106 Raytheon Co., supra note
65.
107 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24, at 48-5 1.
"osId. at 50.
109
Id. Electronic warfare is "[m]ilitary action involving the use of electromagnetic
and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the
enemy." DEP'T OF DEF., Electronic warfare, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
dod dictionary/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
POWER: CHALLENGES, ECONOMICS AND BENEFITS 1,

1mHAO LING ET AL., supra note 101, at ix.

Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., supra note 103, at 163. These risks are
similar to those posed by buildings, cellular phone towers, and radio broadcast
antennae. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24, at 49.
In April 2014, a single-engine privately owned and operated aircraft struck a
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departing from airports operates at altitudes equivalent to or lower
than the heights of common utility-scale wind turbines discussed
above. 112 Military aircraft use certain training routes at similarly
low altitudes to practice low-level navigation and other
maneuvers.113 For the most part, these risks are well understood
and can be mitigated by proper planning, installing warning lights,
publishing notifications of the hazards, and classifying affected
airspace appropriately." 4
Wind farm construction activities, as well as the steady-state
vehicular and personnel traffic associated with operational wind
farms, bring security concerns to nearby military bases and other
sensitive DoD infrastructure."5 Additionally, the height of the
towers can allow enhanced visibility or sensor access over DoD
facilities and operations that would otherwise be unobservable
from ground level by unauthorized personnel.1 16
The technological and other risks to civil aviation, military
aviation, and other military activities are but a small sample of the
environmental, economic, and social impacts that a permitting
authority must consider when reviewing a proposed wind farm

wind turbine near Highmore, S.D., during inclement weather. Joel Ebert &
David Rookhuyzen, Four dead after plane strikes wind turbine, CAPITAL
JOURNAL (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.capjournal.com/access/four-dead-afterplane-strikes-wind-turbine/articlefef~al22-cf5b-l le3-a984-0019bb2963f4.html.
The pilot and all three passengers were killed. Id.
112 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL 4-3-1

(2014), available at http://www.faa.gov/air-traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/
aim04O3.html#aimO4O3.html. 1.
1'3 Id. at 3-5-2.
114 Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., supra note 103, at 162-63. Warning lights,
however, invite additional challenges from neighboring land owners and
citizens' groups. PHILIP WARBURG, HARVEST THE WIND: AMERICA'S JOURNEY
TO JOBS, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE, AND CLIMATE STABILITY 137-38 (2012). The

lights also could attract migratory birds, increasing the already substantial
likelihood of avian kills associated with wind farm operation. Id.
"'
116 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, supra note 24, at 50.

Id.
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site. 117 The next section of this article explores the development of
electricity generation facility permitting in the United States, both
in general and in the specific context of wind turbines.
III. STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF ELECTRIC POWER
GENERATION FACILITIES

When Thomas Edison flipped the switch, so to speak, at the
Pearl Street Station in New York City on September 4, 1882, the
U.S. electric utility industry was born.'' Pearl Street Station is
recognized as the first commercial electricity generation facility in
the United States."19 Servicing eighty-five customers, this facility
and those like it, which developed soon afterward, could only be
characterized as local interests.120 They were therefore initially
subject only to municipal regulation, if any.12 As the industry
grew with increased demand, smaller producers combined to form
or were absorbed by larger firms. 122 This growth led to the
emergence of state, rather than local, regulation of the electric
industry, including the siting of generation facilities.123

See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Facility Siting and Permitting, in THE
Gerrard
ed. 2011) (surveying site permitting considerations for renewable energy projects).
1

LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 95 (Michael B.
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 446 (1989).

'19 Id.
120

THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY
FOR THE 21ST

CENTURY 12-8 to 12-9 (2000).
121 TOMAIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 448.
122 THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 120, at 12-9.
123 TOMAIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 448.
The electric industry comprises

three distinct phases: generation, transmission, and distribution. THE ENERGY
LAW GROUP, supra note 120, at 12-1. Because wind farms are electricity
generators, this article is most concerned with the generation phase, and
therefore the discussion and analysis will deal primarily with permitting schema
and other regulations on generation facility siting. It bears noting, however, that
facility siting for all three phases of the industry is subject to state regulation.
See Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point ofFederalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 219
n.2 (2012) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)). But see 16 U.S.C § 824p
(2012) (granting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority
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Congress moved to clarify the distinctions between federal and
state responsibilities in the regulation of the electric industry in
1935.124 The Federal Power Actl25 resolved a perceived "gap" in
the regulation of interstate transmission and distribution of
electricity, 126 but left generation (as well as intrastatetransmission
and distribution) in the purview of the states. 12 7 It has remained
there for nearly eight decades.1 28 This reservation of authority
applies to the siting of renewable energy generation facilities as
well. 129
There is no uniform approach to wind farm site permitting
among the states. 130 In approximately a quarter of states, facility

to issue construction permits for transmission facilities to "be used for the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce" in areas designated by
the Secretary of Energy as "national interest electric transmission corridor[s,]"
provided that no state may approve the project in question, that the project does
not meet state permitting criteria due to its interstate nature, or that a state
commission or other permitting entity has withheld approval or imposed
conditions on approval which would undercut national interests).
124 Stein, supra note 123,
at 220.
12516 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c.
126 See THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 120, at 12-11 to 12-12

(discussing Pub. Utils. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273
U.S. 83 (1927), and the "Attleboro Gap" as the impetus for the Federal Power
Act).
127 See generally 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (reserving jurisdiction "over facilities
used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local
distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate
commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed
wholly by the transmitter").
128 Stein, supra note 123, at 221.

129 Salkin, supra note 117, at 103. Another reason that state and local governments
have a preeminent role in wind farm siting is because of its land-use-planning
implications-traditionally an area of local control. Salkin & Ostrow, supra note
10, at 1051.
130 Ass'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
WIND POWER SITING REGULATIONS AND WILDLIFE GUIDELINES IN THE UNITES

STATES 2 (2007), available at http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/windpower/
afwa%20wind%20power%20final%20report.pdf.
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permitting is a local zoning matter.'31 In others, the state public
utilities commission issues permits. 132 Still others divide
responsibility based on the size of the prospective facility, with
local governments permitting smaller scale projects while state
agencies site the larger facilities.1 33
Only a handful of states have statutory code provisions or
administrative rules specifically addressing wind power siting.134

These states include Colorado, 135 Minnesota,136 North Carolina,137
North Dakota, 138 Oregon, 139 South Dakota, 140 Vermont, 141 and
Wisconsin.142 Other states deal with wind farm siting as a matter of
local government jurisdiction, apply conventional electric
generation site permitting authorities, or apply siting authorities
applicable to renewable energy generally.143

131Id. Local wind turbine ordinances may address issues including height

restrictions, setback requirements, color limitations, and noise limits. Salkin,
supra note 117, at 104-05.
132 Ass'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,

supra note 130, at 2.
1 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 10, at 1066.
134 See generally Ass'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE

SERV., supra note 130 (surveying wind power information for all 50 states,
including points of contact, installed power in MW, renewable portfolio
standards, renewable energy incentives, siting authorities, and wildlife
guidelines).
'3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.7-101 (2013).
136 MINN. STAT. § 216F.01 (2013); MINN. R. 7854.0100 (2013).
13 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.115 (2013). This Article will discuss the North
Carolina statute in detail below.
N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06-10-01 (2013). The North Dakota rules only
apply to facilities generating 20 MW of electricity or less. Id.
139 OR. ADMIN. R. 345-024-0010 (2013).
140 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-1 (2013); S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:10:22:33.02

(2013).
141VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,

§ 2480 (2013); tit. 18-ch. 1 VT. CODE R. 18-1 § 20

(2013).
142 WIS. STAT.

§ 196.378(4g) (2013); Wis. ADMIN. CODE, PSC § 128.01 (2013).

143 Salkin, supra note 117, at 103-04. The legislature of Alabama considered,
but did not pass, a wind-specific siting bill in April 2014. Chris Marr, Alabama
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Some states, like New York, require comprehensive
environmental reviews similar to those executed by the federal
government under the National Environmental Policy Act 144
("NEPA").14 5 NEPA and its state equivalents require permitting
agencies in certain circumstances to take a "hard look" at how
proposed projects may affect wildlife, water quality, aesthetics,
and other environmental concerns. 146
The foregoing survey of permitting authorities pertains to
geographic areas under the sovereign jurisdiction of the states.
While the United States presently has no offshore wind generation
capacity, many offshore projects are being financed, planned, or
considered for permitting. 14 7 In the offshore context, the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953148 defines a coastal state's geographic jurisdiction
to extend to a line three nautical miles from the coast.149 Wind
turbines situated within these state territorial waters would be
subject to state or local permitting as described above.1 50 The
Coastal Zone Management Act1 5' ("CZMA") provides that, even
in federal waters seaward of the three-mile line, states with
approved coastal zone management plans can require that federal
permitting actions affecting the state's coastal zone be consistent
with the state's planning efforts and regulations.152 These consistency

Puts Strict Limits on Wind Farms in Two Counties but Passes No State Rules,
BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT (April 7, 2014).
144 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).

145 Salkin, supra note 117, at 96.
46
1 Id. at 96-97.

147 Nat'1 Renewable Energy Lab., supra note 103, at 7.
148 43 U.S.C.

§ 1301 (2012).

149 43 U.S.C. § 1312. States' sovereignty within the three-mile zone remains
subject to federal preemption in the areas of "commerce, navigation, national
defense, and international affairs . . . ."

§ 1314(a).

1so Nat'1 Renewable Energy Lab., supra note 103, at 133-34.
1s1 16 U.S.C.

§ 1451 (2012).

16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2012). A detailed consideration of federal wind farm
siting (where states' interests are not involved) is beyond the scope of this
article.
152
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reviews will almost always come into play for offshore wind farms
because, among other possible effects, the transmission lines by
necessity will traverse the coastal state's jurisdictional waters. 153
The following section explains the ways in which the federal
government can protect its interests in state wind siting actions,
especially regarding the risks to aviation and military activities
described earlier.

IV.

FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE OR LOCAL PERMITTING OF
WIND FARM SITING

Even in areas where the state has sole jurisdiction to permit
constructing a wind farm, a variety of federal agencies may also be
involved. 154 For example, turbines erected on wetlands or in
navigable waters may require a Clean Water Act'ss permit from the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("CoE").15 6 Outside of permitting,
several federal programs offer financial subsidies or tax credits for
development of renewable energy sources.157

153 Adam Vann, Wind Energy: Offshore Permitting, in OFFSHORE WIND POWER:
CHALLENGES, ECONOMICS AND BENEFITS 213, 215 (Samuel D. Perkins &

Melanie A. Everett eds. 2011). Note that the siting of the transmission
infrastructure may be subject to state permitting requirements independent of
both the CZMA consistency review and the federal permitting for constructing
the generation facility. Id.
154 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 10, at 1076-77.
"s 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
156 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 10, at 1077. See generally 33 U.S.C.

§ 1344
(2012) (detailing CoE's program for permitting discharges of dredged or fill
materials into U.S. waters). Other agencies that have limited preemption or
review obligations regarding state wind farm permitting include the DoE, the
FERC, the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the Forest
Service, the Minerals Management Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Salkin, supra note 117, at 103; Salkin &
Ostrow, supra note 10, at 1066.
157 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 10, at 1078-1080.
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Regarding wind farms' effects on aviation, including physical
obstruction and interference with radar, the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") is the de facto lead agency to voice the
federal government's concerns.158 In the Federal Aviation Act,' 59
Congress required the Secretary of Transportation to assess any
proposed construction or alteration of structures that could "result
in an obstruction of the navigable airspace or an interference with
air navigation facilities and equipment or the navigable airspace
. . ."160 The statute prescribes the following standards:
[T]he Secretary shall conduct an aeronautical study to decide the extent
of any adverse impact on the safe and efficient use of the airspace,
facilities, or equipment. In conducting the study, the Secretary shall
consider factors relevant to the efficient and effective use of the
navigable airspace, including(A) the impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for
aircraft operating under visual flight rules;
(B) the impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft
operating under instrument flight rules;
(C) the impact on existing public-use airports and aeronautical facilities;
(D) the impact on planned public-use airports and aeronautical facilities;
and
(E) the cumulative impact resulting from the proposed construction or
alteration of a structure when combined with the impact of other
existing or proposed structures. 161

The FAA implements these statutory requirements through its
Obstruction Evaluation/Airport Airspace Analysis ("OE/AAA")
162
program.

Id. at 1078.
U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1).

15949
160 49

161 Id.
162

See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Obstruction Evaluation / Airport

Airspace Analysis (OE/AAA), https://oeaaa.faa.gov/oeaaalexternal/portal.jsp (last
visited Mar. 8, 2014) (providing an overview of the OE/AAA process). Title 14,
Part 77, of the Code of Federal Regulations, "Safe, Efficient Use, and Preservation
of the Navigable Airspace" ("Part 77"), sets forth the OE/AAA program.
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The OE/AAA program requires notification to the FAA before
constructing or altering any structure higher than 200 feet above
ground level, regardless of location. 163 It also applies to lower
structures if they are within certain horizontal distances of an
airport runway and the structure vertically intersects an imaginary
graded slope from the runway.164 Proponents of the construction or
alteration (termed "sponsors" by FAA Form 7460-1, "Notice of
Proposed Construction or Alteration")1 65 must submit the required
notice to the FAA no later than 45 days before commencing
construction or applying for a permit, whichever comes first.166
The threshold determination the FAA makes in the OE/AAA
process is whether the structure in question would be an
"obstruction to air navigation" within the meaning of the
implementing regulation.167 Chief among the applicable standards
is whether the structure is 499 feet high or higher regardless of
location-if it is, then it is an obstruction.168 Lower heights apply
to structures that are closer to airports.1 69 The FAA presumes
obstructions to be "hazards to air navigation" (an OE/AAA term of
art discussed in detail below) unless a later aeronautical study
concludes otherwise.' 70
163 14
164

C.F.R. § 77.9(a) (2014).
§ 77.9(b). At larger airports (with runways longer than 3,200 feet), the

slope is 100 to 1, out to a distance of 20,000 feet horizontally from the runway.
§ 77.9(b)(1). So a tower one mile (5,280 feet) away from a large airport would
trigger Part 77's notice requirement if it was higher than 52.8 feet. Smaller
airports have a steeper (therefore more lenient to proposed structures) slope-50
to 1, out to a distance of 10,000 feet. § 77.9(b)(2). At heliports, the slope is 25 to
1, out to 5,000 feet. § 77.9(b)(3).
165See

FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Notice of Proposed Construction or Alteration,

http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Form/FAA%20Form%207460- 1
2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
166 14 C.F.R. § 77.9(b) (2014).
167 See § 77.17 (promulgating the standards by which the FAA determines
that
structures are obstructions).
168 § 77.17(a)(1).
169 § 77.17(a)(2)-(5).
170§

77.15(b).
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Even if a proposed project would not qualify as an obstruction
due to its height, it may still require an aeronautical study if it "is
found to have physical or electromagnetic radiation effect on the
operation of air navigation facilities."' 7 The term "air navigation
facilities" is understood to include air traffic control radar

systems.172
The aeronautical study's purpose "is to determine whether the
aeronautical effects of the specific proposal and, where
appropriate, the cumulative impact resulting from the proposed
construction or alteration when combined with the effects of other
existing or proposed structures, would constitute a hazard to air
navigation." 73 A study can be initiated at the sponsor's request or
by the FAA's unilateral decision.174 The FAA evaluates a variety
of factors in any given study, including "[t]he potential effect on
[air traffic control], direction finders, [air traffic control] tower
line-of-sight visibility, and physical or electromagnetic effects on
air navigation, communication facilities, and other surveillance
systems." 175 The process provides an opportunity for public
comment during the aeronautical study.176

17n FED AVIATION ADMIN.,

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,

ORDER JO 7400.2J,

6-3-3 (2012). See also Town
of Barnstable, Mass. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 740 F.3d 681, 689 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (affirming FAA's internal policy treating electromagnetic radiation effect
as a coequal threshold factor along with the obstruction determination).
172 See Town of Barnstable, 740 F.3d at 688 (equating "radar interference"
with electromagnetic radiation effect).
PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING AIRSPACE MATTERS

§ 77.25(b).
§ 77.25(c).
17s § 77.29(a)(6). The complete list of factors is as follows:
'

174

(1) The impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for
aircraft operating under visual flight rules;
(2) The impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for
aircraft operating under instrument flight rules;
(3) The impact on existing and planned public use airports;
(4) Airport traffic capacity of existing public use airports and public
use airport development plans received before the issuance of the
final determination;
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Based on its assessment of the prescribed factors, the FAA will
either issue a "Determination of Hazard to Air Navigation".or a
"Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation."1" The FAA may
premise a "No Hazard" determination on the study's outright
conclusion that the structure will not have a substantial impact on
aviation, or it may subject the determination to conditions like
marking or lighting, supplemental notice obligations, or other
mitigating measures. 178 Sponsors or other interested parties may
appeal the FAA's determination by submitting a petition for
discretionary review within 30 days.17 9 The FAA may deny the
petition for review altogether,' 80 or, if it grants review, may
"revise, affirm, or reverse" its original determination after further
study.18 1

(5) Minimum obstacle clearance altitudes, minimum instrument flight
rules altitudes, approved or planned instrument approach
procedures, and departure procedures;
(6) The potential effect on ATC radar, direction finders, ATC tower
line-of-sight visibility, and physical or electromagnetic effects on
air navigation, communication facilities, and other surveillance
systems;
(7) The aeronautical effects resulting from the cumulative impact of a
proposed construction or alteration of a structure when combined
with the effects of other existing or proposed structures.
Id.
176 R. Patrick Phillips, Oh No! Not Another Tower!, EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT
Ass'N (May 1999), http://209.83.103.25/home/govt/legal/articles/Oh%2ONo!%
20Not%2OAnother%2OTower!.asp.
177 § 77.31(c)-(d). See generally FED AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 171, at
chapter 7 (laying out the FAA's determination procedures in greater detail than
does Part 77).
1
77.3 1(d).
' § 77.37(a). To be eligible to submit a petition for discretionary review,
non-sponsoring parties must have "provided a substantive aeronautical comment
on a proposal in an aeronautical study" or have such a comment without having
had an opportunity to submit it. Id. See also § 77.39(b).
80 § 77.4 1(b).
'

§ 77.41(c).

OCT. 2014] Dynamic Federalism and Wind Farm Siting

29

A Determination of Hazard, in and of itself, does not preclude
the contemplated construction or alteration, at least as a matter of
federal law.1 82 But the OE/AAA program requires the FAA to
"advise all known interested persons" of the aeronautical study
results.183 FAA determinations are exceptionally persuasive and
have a high likelihood of being dispositive factors in other agencies'
deliberations on permitting. 184 Those other agencies-federal,
state, or local-may deny construction permits or operating
licenses based on a Determination of Hazard or a sponsor's failure
or refusal to comply with any conditions placed on a
Determination of No Hazard.' 8 5 Such denial may be required by
local or state law, or may be discretionary.18 6 If a structure is built
or altered despite a Determination of Hazard, the FAA could alter
or eliminate air traffic patterns and an individual airport's approach
or departure procedures in light of the proposed hazards, which in
turn could increase travel costs or otherwise impede airport users'
ability to travel to or from the local airport.' 87
In 2011, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act to require
the FAA to give voice in the OE/AAA aeronautical study process
to the DoD and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
182 Phillips, supra note 176.
18 § 77.3 1(a).
184 See Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 659 F.3d 28, 34
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding it likely that the U.S. Department of the Interior would
revoke or modify a federal wind lease for the Cape Wind project in Nantucket
Sound if the FAA had issued a Determination of Hazard to Air Navigation). The
court noted that "Interior would take an FAA finding of hazard very, very
seriously." Id. at 32.
185 Phillips, supra note 176. For example, the Federal Communications
Commission may not issue an operating permit if the FAA has determined that a
broadcast tower is a hazard to air navigation. Id.
116 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.120(c) (2013) (providing that "[n]o
permit for a wind energy facility or wind energy facility expansion shall become
effective until the Department [that may grant the permit] has received and
reviewed the 'Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation' issued by the
[FAA] for the facility").
1 Id.
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("DHS").'" One year earlier, the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 '" ("NDAA 2011")
required the DoD "to ensure that the robust development of
renewable energy sources and the increased resiliency of the
commercial electrical grid may move forward in the United States,
while minimizing or mitigating any adverse impacts on military
operations and readiness." 90 This legislation helped refine the role
of the DoD Siting Clearinghouse ("the Clearinghouse") in the
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment ("DUSD-I&E").19 ' The Clearinghouse's mission
is to "[p]rotect DoD mission capabilities from incompatible
development by collaborating with DoD Components and external
stakeholders to prevent, minimize, or mitigate adverse impacts on
military operations, readiness, and testing.' 92
The DoD implemented the relevant NDAA 2011 requirements
in Title 14, Part 211, of the Code of Federal Regulations, "Mission
Compatibility Evaluation Process" ("Part 211"). Section 211.4(b)
of that part ties the Clearinghouse's mission directly to the FAA's
OE/AAA program: "The participation of the DoD in the process of

188National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 11281, § 332, 125 Stat. 1298, 1369 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44718(e)).
Note that the DHS is the parent cabinet department of the U.S. Coast Guard, the
only branch of the U.S. armed forces not organizationally located within the
DoD. 14 U.S.C. § 3(a) (2012).
189 Pub. L. No. 111-383, 124 Stat. 1298.
'90 1d. at § 358, 124 Stat. at 4198.
' Id, at § 358(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 4198. The Clearinghouse was actually
established in 2010 to provide "a 'one-stop-shop' for comprehensive, expedited
evaluation of energy projects and their potential effect on DoD operations."
Dep't of Def. Siting Clearinghouse, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DoD Siting
Clearinghouse,http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). The
DUSD-l&E's mission is to "[p]rovide installation assets and services necessary
to support [U.S.] military forces in a cost effective, safe, sustainable, and
environmentally sound manner." Office of the Deputy Under Sec'y of Def. for
Installations and Env't, DUSD(I&E) - About I&E, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/ ie orgchart.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
192Dep't of Def. Siting Clearinghouse, supra
note 191.
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the [FAA] conducted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. [§] 44718 shall be
conducted in accordance with this part. No other process shall be
used by a DoD Component."l93
NDAA 2011 requires the Secretary of Defense to designate a
senior official to serve as executive agent and to establish a
"clearinghouse" for OE/AAA review matters.194 Part 211 assigns
this senior official responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics ("USD-AT&L").1 95
The Clearinghouse was established within the Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment.'9 6
Where the OE/AAA process is designed to determine whether
a project poses a hazard to air navigation, Clearinghouse functions
and processes hinge upon the determination whether the project
poses "an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United
States."' 97 Part 211 defines this term as follows:
The construction, alteration, establishment, or expansion, or the
proposed construction, alteration, establishment, or expansion, of a
structure or sanitary landfill that would:
(1) Endanger safety in air commerce, related to the activities of the
DoD.
(2) Interfere with the efficient use and preservation of the navigable
airspace and of airport traffic capacity at public-use airports, related
to the activities of the DoD.

1
194

1'

Emphasis added.
NDAA 201l § 358(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 4198.
32 C.F.R. § 211.5(b) (2013).

"Id. at

§ 211.5(d).

'97 NDAA 2011 § 358(e)(2); see also 32 C.F.R. § 211.1(a) (stating that the
purpose of Part 211's procedures is "to provide [a] formal review of projects for

which applications are filed with the Secretary of Transportation under 49
U.S.C. [§] 44718, to determine if they pose an unacceptable risk to the national
security of the United States"); OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y OF DEF. FOR
ACQUISITION, TECH., & LOGISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO NATIONAL SECURITY FROM COMMERCIAL ENERGY

PROJECTS (2013), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/library/RTC%
20UR%20Final.pdf (summarizing DoD's implementation of NDAA 2011's

mission compatibility evaluation requirements).
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(3) Significantly impair or degrade the capability of the DoD to conduct
training, research, development, testing, and evaluation, and
operations or to maintain military readiness.' 98

The first two factors align very closely with the traditional
OE/AAA analysis as described above.199 The third is far more
expansive, to capture virtually all domestic military activity. 200
Another key concept in the Clearinghouse's procedures is
identifying mitigating measures. 201 Sponsors of projects can
modify their proposals or change the proposed locations to remedy
any adverse impacts on DoD activities.202 Mitigation is not limited
to actions the sponsor might undertake; the DoD itself must
consider changing its activities, facilities, or equipment to
accommodate the proposed project. 203 Sponsors can elect to
contribute financially to DoD's efforts in this regard.2 0 4
The Clearinghouse will assess proposed projects in one of two
contexts. A "formal review" is triggered by the Clearinghouse's
receipt from the FAA of a properly filed OE/AAA application.20 5
Upon receipt, the Clearinghouse will provide the application to any
service branch or other DoD component that may have an
interest. 20 6 Those components then have twenty days to comment
on or make recommendations regarding the application. 207 Within
thirty days of initial receipt of the application from the FAA, the
Clearinghouse must either report to FAA that the project "will not

'9'32 C.F.R. § 211.3(1) (2012).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 158-87.
200 This is not to suggest that any impact whatsoever
on any DoD activity will
trigger an unacceptable risk finding. Recall that the Part 211 definition requires
a significant impairment or degradation. § 211.3(l)(3).
20 NDAA 2011 § 358(e)(1); see also 32 C.F.R. § 211.9 (discussing various
types of mitigation).
202 32 C.F.R. § 211.9(b).
20 3
See id. § 211.9(a).
204Id. § 211.9(b)(3).
205Id. § 211.6(a).
206Id. § 211.6(a)(1).
207Id. § 211.6(a)(2).

OCT. 2014]

Dynamic Federalism and Wind Farm Siting

33

have an adverse impact on military operations and readiness,"208 or
if it may have such an impact, contact the sponsor directly with an
offer to discuss mitigation strategies.2 09 If the DoD lead component
and sponsor reach an agreement on mitigation, the sponsor must
then amend his or her OE/AAA application accordingly. 2 10
If there is no agreement, or if the sponsor refuses to participate
in mitigation discussions at the outset, the Clearinghouse will
consider the comments and recommendations of the interested
DoD components and make a recommendation up the chain of
command regarding whether the project poses an unacceptable risk
to national security. 211 The first stop is with USD-AT&L, in his or
her capacity as the "senior official" within the meaning of NDAA
2011.212

2081d. § 211.6(a)(3)(i).
2091d § 211.6(a)(3)(ii)(A). The Clearinghouse will designate
an appropriate DoD
component to take the lead on mitigation negotiations. Id. § 211.6(a)(3)(ii)(B). It
will also invite the DHS and the FAA to participate. Id. § 211.6(b).
2 10
Id. § 211.6(b)(1)(ii). The Clearinghouse publishes significant mitigation
agreements on its web site. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
NAVY, & TEX. WIND GROUP, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON RIVIERA I
WIND
TURBINE
FARM,
KINGSVILLE,
TX
(2012),
available at
http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2012/04/TWG-MOA.pdf
(documenting an
agreement regarding the Riviera I Wind Turbine Farm near Naval Air Station
Kingsville, Texas); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, E.ON
CLIMATE & RENEWABLES, N. AM., & PETRONILLA WIND FARM, LLC,
DEVELOPMENT OF A WIND TURBINE FARM IN NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS (2012),
available at http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2012/11 /E.ON-NAS-KingsvilleFinal-MOA-with-Signatures.pdf (documenting an agreement regarding the
Petronilla Wind project near Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Tex.);
INVENERGY WIND DEV., LLC, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., & U.S. AIR FORCE, PANTEGO
WIND ENERGY PROJECT AGREEMENT (2014), available at http://www.acq.
osd.mil/dodsc/library/Final%20Pantego%20agreement_6JAN2014%20As%20A
mended%20for%2OPublic%2OView.pdf (documenting an agreement regarding
the Pantego Wind Energy Project near Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North
Carolina).
211 32 C.F.R. § 211.6.
212

id
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The senior official may either concur or not concur with the
Clearinghouse's recommendation, and in turn will forward the
application to the "senior officer" (not to be confused with "senior
official") who is ultimately authorized to convey the DoD's
position to the Secretary of Transportation.213 The Deputy Secretary
of Defense acts as senior officer for this purpose. 214 He or she will
articulate to the Secretary of Transportation whether the proposed
project poses an unacceptable risk to national security and, if it
does, on what grounds the DoD reached that conclusion.2 15 Formal
determinations of unacceptable risk to national security by the senior
officer require notification to Congress. 2 16
Besides the "formal review" procedure just described, the
Clearinghouse can also informally review a proposal at the request
of the project's proponent.217 When a proponent submits a request
for an informal review to the Clearinghouse, the Clearinghouse
will in turn distribute the request to the service branches or other
DoD components that may have an interest. 2 18 Those components
will review, comment, and make recommendations.2 1 9

Id.; see also NDAA 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 358(e)(4),
124 Stat.
4200-01 (limiting delegation of "senior officer" status from the Secretary of
Defense to the following three positions: Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
USD-AT&L, and the Principal Deputy USD-AT&L).
214
215 32 C.F.R. § 211.5(a).
1d. § 211.6.
216 NDAA 2011 § 358(e)(3).
217 32 C.F.R. § 211.7; see also NDAA 2011 § 358(c)(3),
124 Stat. 4199
(requiring the DoD to "establish procedures for ... the coordinated consideration
of and response to a request for a review received from State and local officials
or the developer of a renewable energy development or other energy project, . . .
213

and ensure a coordinated Department response . . . ."). The requester could also

be a state or local government. 32 C.F.R. § 211.7(b)(2) (ii)(B).
2 18
1d. § 211.7(b). If the request is made to a DoD organization other than the
Clearinghouse (e.g., a nearby military installation), Part 211 requires the DoD
component involved to forward the request to the Clearinghouse, unless it has
been previously assigned by the Clearinghouse to conduct mitigation
discussions
regarding the project at issue. Id. § 211.8.
219
Id. § 211.7(b)(1).
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After reviewing those comments and recommendations, the
Clearinghouse may determine that the proposal will not adversely
impact DoD activities.2 2 0 If the Clearinghouse so determines, it
will relay that determination to the requester with the caveats that
the informal determination does not substitute for a completed
OE/AAA determination by the FAA and that it is not binding on
the DoD. 22 1 If the Clearinghouse determines that the proposed
project would have an adverse impact, it will invite the requester to
222
participate in mitigation discussions.
In 2012, the DoD reported to Congress that the Clearinghouse
had reviewed a backlog of 506 renewable energy projects, finding
no adverse impact in 486 and entering mitigation discussions or
further study in the remaining 20, but ultimately not determining
that any were unacceptable risks to national security. 223
Additionally, the Clearinghouse conducted formal reviews of
1,769 OE/AAA applications. 224 Of those, 1,730 were determined
"to have little or no impact on" DoD activities. 225 The remainder,
as of the date of the DoD's report to Congress, were subject to
226
further analysis. Again, the DoD reported no unacceptable risks
to national security, but ten projects were subject to mitigation
227
negotiations.

220 Id.

§ 211.7(b)(2)(i).

Id.
Id. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii)(A). If the requester is a state or local government, the
Clearinghouse will simply inform the requester of the determination without
initiating mitigation discussions. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii)(B).
221

222

223 DEP'T OF DEF. SITING CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL

REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2012), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/

library/fy2012-rpt-to-congress.pdf.
224 DEP'T OF DEF. SITING CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS - CALENDAR YEAR 2012 1 (2013), available at

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/library/fy2013-rpt-to-congress.pdf.
2 25
Id. DoD reported to Congress that those 1,730 projects totaled approximately
38 gigawatts of renewable power. Id
226 Id.
227 1d. at 2.
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Outside of the OE/AAA and Clearinghouse processes, the DoD
has at times sought to collaborate with state officials in the
planning and site evaluation for renewable energy projects. For
example, in 2011 the DoD entered into a memorandum of
understanding with the California Department of Fish and Game,
the California Energy Commission, the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to participate
in California's Renewable Energy Action Team and Desert
Renewable Energy Conservation Plan.22 8 The parties agreed to:
[w]ork together on the development of additional renewable energy
resources in California's Mojave and Colorado Desert Regions,
including identifying, as far in advance as practicable, those geographic
areas and technical and environmental features that merit heightened
consideration so that renewable energy project and transmission line
development is consistent with and does not impede DoD's military
mission.229

With one exception, the state siting authorities, wind-specific
or otherwise, discussed in the previous section, do not expressly
address the consideration of military equities. The upcoming
section will examine the sole exception.
V. NORTH CAROLINA'S WIND ENERGY FACILITY PERMITTING
STATUTE

On March 28, 2013, N.C. Representative John Bell introduced
House Bill 484 ("H.B. 484"), entitled "Permitting of Wind Energy
Facilities" to the N.C. General Assembly. 230 H.B. 484 would

228

CAL. DEP'T OF FISH & GAME, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, U.S. BUREAU
OF
LAND MGMT., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., & U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING PARTICIPATION AND ENGAGEMENT
IN THE CALIFORNIA RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION TEAM AND THE DESERT
RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN (2011), available at http://www.

drecp.org/documents/docs/RenewableEnergyAction Team_andDept-of Def
ense MOUDec_2011 .pdf.
229It. at
4.
23
0H.B. 484, 2013 Gen. Assemb. Sess. (N.C. 2013), http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/
Applications/BillLookUp/LoadBillDocument.aspx?SessionCode=2013&DocNu
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establish procedures and requirements for any person to obtain a
permit from the state Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR") to construct a wind energy facility in the
state.231 Among its comprehensive requirements, the bill would
specifically require identifying potential impacts to military
activities and engagement with nearby military base officials
during the site evaluation process.2 32
On May 1, 2013, the N.C. House of Representatives passed
H.B. 484 with 112 votes in favor and only 2 opposed.2 3 Bell
touted the passage as "a huge win for protecting our military's
low-altitude training routes, bombing practice ranges and other
critical military interests in North Carolina . ...234 The North
Carolina Senate passed the bill unanimously with. minor
amendments on May 14,235 and the House approved the amended
bill the next day with 111 in favor and just 1 opposed.2 3 6 Governor
Pat McCrory signed the bill into law on May 17.237 The law is
codified in Chapter 143, Article 21C, of the North Carolina

m=2436&SeqNum=0; see also Rep. Chuck McGrady, Preserving Military
Readiness (May 1, 2013), http://nchousel17.com/preserving-military-readiness/
(announcing H.B. 484's passage in the state house).
231 N.C. H.B. 484.

Id.
233 N.C. Gen. Assemb., House of Representatives Roll-Call Transcript
(May 1, 2013), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/
RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession=2013&sChamber-H&RCS=424.
234 Rep. Chuck McGrady, supra note 230.
235 N.C. Gen. Assemb., Senate Roll-Call Transcript(May 14, 2013), available
at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?
sSession=2013&sChamber-s&RCS=345.
236 N.C. Gen. Assemb., House of Representatives Roll-Call Transcript
(May 15, 2013), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/
RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession=2013&sChamber-h&RCS=760.
237 Andrew M. Ballard, North Carolina Governor Signs Bill on Siting, Operating
Wind Energy Facilities, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY AND CLIMATE REPORT, May
20, 2013.
232
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General Statutes, "Permitting of Wind Energy Facilities" ("Article

21 C"). 2 38

Article 21C provides that "[n]o person shall undertake
construction, operation, or expansion activities associated with a
wind energy facility in this State without first obtaining a permit
from the [DENR]." 23 9 Six months before even applying for such a
permit, however, the prospective applicant must request a
"preapplication site evaluation meeting" through the DENR.24 0
In the "preapplication package," the applicant must describe
the proposed facility or expansion, provide a construction and
operation timeline, list all agencies (local, state, and federal) from
which additional permits will be required, describe expected
wildlife impacts, and disclose "any known potential impacts of the
proposed wind energy project location on civil air navigation or
military air navigation routes, air traffic control areas, military
training routes, special-use air space, radar, or other potentially
affected military operations." 24 1
The DENR must schedule the meeting no later than four
months before the applicant files the permit application. 242 Article
21C further requires DENR to invite potential outside stakeholders
to participate in the preapplication meeting, including "the
commanding military officer or the commanding military officer's
designee
of any potentially affected major military
installation ....
The purpose of the preapplication meeting is

238

N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 143-215.115 (2013).

239 § 143-215.116. The term "wind energy facility" is defined
as "the turbines,
accessory buildings, transmission facilities, and any other equipment necessary
for the operation of the facility that cumulatively, with any other wind energy
facility whose turbines are located within one-half mile of one another, have a
rated capacity of one megawatt or more of energy." § 143-215.115(2).
240 § 143-215.117(a).
241 Id.

§ 143-215.117(b).

242Id. § 143-215.117(a).
243Id. § 143-215.117(c). The statute also lists the CoE, the FWS, the state
Wildlife Resources Commission (WRC), and "any other party that the
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to determine if the project will pose a threat to civil or military
aviation, other military activities, or natural resources. 244 Article
21C requires yet another advance meeting before submitting a
perfected application for a permit-this time a scoping meeting
between the prospective applicant and the DENR.245 Again, the
DENR must invite other participants, including the FAA and the
military representatives described above. 24 6
After the site evaluation and scoping meetings, the applicant
may then file his or her application for a permit to construct or
expand the wind facility in question.2 4 7 Among its many required
procedural and substantive requirements, 24 8 Article 21C requires
applicants to show the extent to which they have complied with
OE/AAA or Clearinghouse processes. 249 To apply for a permit, a

Department deems relevant." Id. Recall that 32 C.F.R. § 211.8 requires DoD
components to forward such matters to the Clearinghouse unless they have been
previously designated by the Clearinghouse to engage in discussions on the
matter in question. Supra note 218.
244

N.C. GEN. STAT.

245

§ 143-215.117(a) (2013).

1Id. § 143-215.118(a).
246 Id. § 143-215.118(b). The statute also lists the WRC, the FWS, and
governments of affected municipalities. Id.
247 § 143-215.119.

248 These requirements include a project description with a map, a deed or
lease reflecting the legal right to develop the facility, identities of adjacent
landowners, a noise impact study, a shadow flicker study, a natural resource a
wildlife impact study, a decommissioning plan, a prima facie showing of the
permit approval criteria in § 143-215.120 (discussed infra at the text
accompanying notes 255-58), and a $3,500 application fee. § 143-215.119(a).
249 Article 21C expressly requires the following items relevant to military
installations and operations:
(5) A description of civil air navigation or military air navigation
routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes, special-use
air space, radar, or other military operations that may be affected
by the construction or operation of the proposed wind energy
facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion.
(6) Documentation that addresses any potential adverse impact on
military operations and readiness as identified by the ...
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wind farm developer must have either obtained a completed
OE/AAA determination from the FAA (in which case the DoD
would have provided input to the FAA through Part 211's
Clearinghouse procedures) or must have initiated an informal
review request to the Clearinghouse.2 50
The statute requires the DENR then to notify military officials
at the potentially affected bases as well as the appropriate local
government officials. 25 1 Along with the notification, the DENR
must request feedback on potential adverse impacts. 252 Upon
request from these parties, the DENR must provide the permit
application with all supplementary materials in its entirety, except
for confidential or trade secret information. 253

Clearinghouse pursuant to [Part 211] ... and any mitigation actions
agreed to by the applicant.
(7) Documentation that the applicant has either (i) submitted [FAA]
Form 7460-1 for the turbines associated with the proposed wind
energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion or (ii)
initiated an informal review by the .. . Clearinghouse of the

proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility
expansion. If the applicant has submitted [FAA] Form 7460-1 in
order to fulfill the requirements of this subdivision, the applicant
shall provide any determination reached by the [FAA] at the time
the application is submitted to the [DENR]. If the [FAA] has not
made a determination at the time the application is submitted to the
[DENR], the application shall include a description of the status of
the applicant's engagement with the [FAA] and the ... Clearinghouse.
Id. (emphasis added).
250
Id. Note the statutory language quoted supra at note 249 requiring the
applicant to "include a description of the status of the applicant's engagement
with [the] Clearinghouse" if the OE/AAA determination is not complete.
251 Id. § 143-215.119(d).
252
Id. Regarding the information the DENR requests from military officials,
the statute calls for "technical information related to any adverse impact on the
installation's operations, training, or mission, including military air navigation
routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes, special-use air space,
radar or other military operations that may be affected." Id. § 143-215.119(d)(2).
253 Id. § 143-215.119(d); see also § 143-215.124 (limiting disclosure of confidential
information and trade secrets).
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Before adjudicating the permit application and within seventyfive days of its submission, the DENR must hold public hearings in
every county in which the proposed wind farm is to be situated.2 5 4
Besides the standard public notice requirement, the DENR must
notify the local military officials of the hearing.2 55
Article 21C provides extensive approval criteria for wind farm
permits.2 56 The DENR must approve the permit unless it finds that
the proposed project would adversely impact the environment
(including wildlife and aesthetic considerations associated with
state or national parks), obstruct marine navigation, violate local
zoning requirements, or violate any other federal or state law or
local ordinance. 2 57 Importantly, the DENR may not approve a wind
permit if it finds that the project "would encroach upon or would
otherwise have a significant adverse impact on the mission,
training, or operations of any major military installation or branch
of military in North Carolina and result in a detriment to continued
military presence in the State." 258 The statute requires the DENR to
"consider whether the proposed wind energy facility or proposed
wind energy facility expansion would cause interference with air
navigation routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes,
or radar based on information submitted by the applicant under
[the permit application requirements quoted above], and any
information received" from military officials in response to the
request for adverse impact assessment described above. 2 59
The DENR must adjudicate permit applications within three
months of submission or within one month of receiving the FAA's
OE/AAA determination or other follow-up information that the

254

Id. § 143-215.119(e).
Id. § 143-215.119(e)(3). The DENR must also separately notify the North
Carolina Utilities Commission, the state Attorney General, and affected
municipal governments. § 143-215.119.
256 § 143-215.120(a).
257 id
258
1d. § 143-215.120(a)(2).
259 Id.
255
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DENR may have requested from any party, whichever is later. 260
The statute expressly requires a Determination of No Hazard from
the FAA; no permit may become effective in the absence of such a
determination. 26 1
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which the DoD, after
following Part 211 's formal review process, 262 takes the position
that a proposed wind project poses an unacceptable risk to national
security (without agreement for or possibility of mitigation) and
conveys that position to the Secretary of Transportation, but the
FAA issues a Determination of No Hazard despite the DoD's
position. There is no Article 21C prohibition on a permit's
issuance or effectiveness if the DoD makes a determination of
unacceptable risk.2 63 But in the face of such a determination, the
DENR would be hard pressed to permit the proposed facility given
the law's prohibition on permit approval for projects that "would
encroach upon or would otherwise have a significant adverse
impact on the mission, training, or operations of any major military
installation . ...264

The statute thus grants the DoD, a federal agency, what might
be characterized as "soft veto" 26 5 authority over an ostensibly
state-level decision-making process. Under Part 211's requirement
that DoD components forward to the Clearinghouse inquiries
regarding mission compatibility with proposed renewable energy
projects, 26 6 all DENR engagement with local military officials
described above should implicate the Clearinghouse and, at a
260

d. § 143-215.120(b).
Id. § 143-215.120(c).
262 See supra notes 204-15 and accompanying text (describing the
formal
review procedures).
263 Id. § 143-215.115-126.
264
Id. § 143-215.120(a)(2). Further, in the coastal zone context, the DENR's
administrative rules mandate that "the siting of energy facilities and related
structures" shall avoid "military air space, training or target area and transit
lanes. . . ." 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE R. 7M.0403(f)(10) (2014).
265 See supra note 35 (explaining the author's use of the term "soft
veto").
266 32 C.F.R. § 211.8 (2013).
261
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minimum, Part 211's informal review process. 267 Part 211 provides
for either informal engagement or a formal determination intended
for consideration by the Secretary of Transportation. 26 It is not
readily apparent whether either NDAA 2011 or Part 211
contemplates the DoD executing such a soft veto.
North Carolina is the first jurisdiction at any level to expressly
mandate direct engagement with military stakeholders in the
course of wind facility permitting. Keeping that novelty in mind,
the next two sections of this article discuss Article 21C's
federalism and authority implications from the state and federal
perspectives, beginning with an analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages North Carolina accrues or incurs by essentially
making wind farm permits contingent upon the DoD's
acquiescence.
VI. A WORTHWHILE CONCESSION OF STATE AUTHORITY?

North Carolina's unsolicited deference to the DoD in wind
farm permitting-a function traditionally reserved to state
discretion-reflects the depth and importance of the state's
relationship with the military installations situated there. 269 The
state is home to six bases servicing all five branches of the U.S.

If the applicant has already submitted an FAA Form 7460-1, initiating the
OE/AAA process, then the formal review procedures would apply. See supra
notes 204-15 and accompanying text (explaining the formal review rules and
process). Recall also that, in the context of military review of OE/AAA
applications, Part 211 admonishes, "[n]o other process shall be used by a DoD
Component." 32 C.F.R. § 211.4(b).
268 See supra notes 196-221 and accompanying text (surveying the Part 211
processes).
269 See generally Pat McCrory, Keeping Military Strong Will Keep North
Carolina Strong, JDNEWS.COM (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.idnews.com/
news/columns/keeping-military-strong-will-keep-north-carolina-strong- 1.251804
(expressing state governor's appreciation for North Carolina's military bases
and resident retirees and affirming his intent "to ensure that the military remains
a vital part of [North Carolina's] culture, economy, and . .. future").
267
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armed forces.2 70 According to Governor McCrory, those facilities
bring $48 billion and 540,000 jobs to the state's economy. 27 1
In this context, it is no surprise that H.B. 484 passed both
houses in the General Assembly nearly unanimously. 272 When the
bill passed the North Carolina House of Representatives, its
sponsor, Rep. Bell declared, "[this] vote ensures that North
Carolina stays the most military-friendly state in the nation." 273
One month later, the state enacted the Military Lands Protection
Act of 2013 (MLPA). 274 This statute, which passed both houses
unanimously,275 expresses the finding that "North Carolina has a
vested economic interest in preserving, maintaining, and sustaining
land uses that are compatible with military activities at major
installations." 276 The MLPA effectively bars local governments
from permitting any structure over 200 feet high to be erected
within 5 miles of a military base if it "would encroach upon or
otherwise interfere with the mission, training, or operations of any
major military installation in North Carolina and result in a
detriment to continued militarypresence in the State."277

270

NC.GOV, Military, http://www.nc.gov/govemment/military.aspx (last visited
Mar. 10, 2014). The state is also home to several Coast Guard facilities. U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Sector North Carolina - Sector
Units, http://www.uscg.mil/d5/sectNorthCarolina/otherncunits.asp (last visited
Mar. 10, 2014).
271 McCrory, supra note 269. This represents ten percent of the state's
economy. Id.
272 See supra notes 229-37 and accompanying text (summarizing H.B. 484's
legislative history).
273 McGrady, supra note
230.
274 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 206 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-151.70
et.
seq. (2013)).
275 N.C. Gen. Assemb., House Bill 433 Information/History (2013-2014
Session), http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=
2013&BilIID=h433
(last modified June 26, 2013).
276
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-151.72 (2013).
277
1d. § 143-151.75 (emphasis added). Like Article 21C, the MLPA also
requires procedural engagement with local military authorities. Id. § 143151.75(c). Because they are treated comprehensively in Article 21C, wind
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But what about North Carolina's interest in preserving,
maintaining, and sustaining its unpreempted authority-as a
sovereign state-to site electricity generation facilities? The
concept of federalism and "states' rights" is subject to a debate as
old as the Constitution, if not older. 2 78 James Madison opined that
federal powers would be inclined to defer to state interests:
The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the
federal government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it
will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will
carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government.
A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of
Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the
particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors
committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the
members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the
State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in
which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to
embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be
imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union,
and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their
affections and consultations? 279

On its face, Article 21C seems to represent just the sort of
disposition to federal interest that Madison posited "will rarely
happen." 280 Of course, given the obvious economic considerations
described above, it would be disingenuous to characterize Article
21C's wind farm permitting regime, even given its deference to
federal authority, as intended to effectuate "the aggregate
prosperity of the Union." 28 1 But irrespective of intent, the effect is
to diminish, to some extent, the state's control over wind farm

energy facilities are exempt from MLPA. § 143-151.74(a). As this Article
pertains to wind farm permitting in particular, in-depth analysis of the MLPA is
beyond the scope of this Article. It is mentioned here simply to emphasize the
General Assembly's keen interest in maintaining the U.S. military presence in
North Carolina.
278 SOTIRIos A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES' RIGHTS 1 (2013).
279 THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
28
0

281

d

Id.
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siting. In doing so, North Carolina has not only lessened its power
to influence where wind facilities are located, it has also lessened
its ability to choose wind as an energy resource over conventional
fuels or renewable sources not subject to the consultation
requirement.2 82
North Carolina is certainly not the only state with interests in
both wind power and military presence. Table A compares North
Carolina to the top five wind-energy-producing states.

Rank

State

Installed wind power
capacity (in MW)

Major military
installations

1

Texas

12,355

11

2

California

5,830

19

3

Iowa

5,178

0

4

Illinois

3,568

2

5

Oregon

3,153

0

40

North Carolina

0

6

Table A - Top five wind-energy-producing states (and North
Carolina) 283

See Stein, supra note 123, at 219 (explaining that "the authority to
determine whether to approve construction of a new electricity generation
282

facility . . . necessarily entails an assessment of the resources used by the facility

to generate electricity, as well as determinations about location").
AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, AWEA U.S. WIND INDUSTRY FOURTH QUARTER
2013 MARKET REPORT 6 (Jan. 30, 2014) (on file with author). See also U.S.
Dep't of Def., MilitaryINSTALLA TIONS, http://www.militaryinstallations.dod.mil
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (providing a search tool to view military installations
in each state).
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Three of the top five states have military bases within their
state lines. The top two, Texas and California, each host a
significantly higher number of bases than North Carolina's six.
Texas and California rely heavily on military presence, just as
North Carolina does.2 84 Yet none of the top five states have windspecific statutory or regulatory siting authority, let alone military
consultation requirements like Article 21C's. 285 Texas and California
both occupy substantially larger geographic areas than North
Carolina, and the topographic characteristics of both states offer
drastically larger potential for onshore wind generation.2 8 6 With
more space and more wind, these states have more flexibility to
site wind facilities in areas where they are less prone to encroach

See Letter from Paul Paine, Chair, Tex. Military Preparedness Comm'n, to
Tex. Governor Rick Perry (2012) (cover letter to TEX. MILITARY PREPAREDNESS
COMM'N, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, TEXAS-THE DEFENSE COMMUNITYBIENNIAL REPORT 2011-2012 (2012), available at http://govemor.state.tx.
us/files/military/2011-12_TMPCAnnualReport.pdf (noting "that the military
and defense industry is attributable for much of Texas's economic prosperity"
including "an economic impact . . . of over $140 billion with a domestic
disposable income of approximately $54 billion[,] making the military and
defense industry one of the largest economic sectors in the state"); Office of Cal.
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Convenes State Military
Council (Mar. 28, 2013), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17973 (statement of
California Governor Jerry Brown) ("[M]ilitary bases and activities are vital to
284

our state's economy. . . .").
285 See supra notes 134-42 (enumerating the limited number of states that
have wind-specific siting authorities).
286 See AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, TEXAS WIND ENERGY 2 (2014), available
at http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/Texas.pdf (reporting that
Texas's "onshore wind potential at 80 meters hub height is 1,901,530 MW"
according to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory); AM. WIND ENERGY
Ass'N, CALIFORNIA WIND ENERGY 2 (2014), available at http://awea.files.cmsplus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/Califomia.pdf (reporting California's onshore potential
at 34,110 MW); AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, NORTH CAROLINA WIND ENERGY 1,
available at http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/ northcarolina.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (reporting North Carolina's onshore potential at 808
MW).
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on military activities. But wind farm-related encroachment issues
-287
may still arise.
Southeastern coastal states from Louisiana to Virginia have
virtually no installed wind power generation capacity. 2 88 Even
though their onshore wind potential may be relatively low, their
offshore capacities can be several orders of magnitude higher. 289
Each of those states hosts military installations.2 0 They are closer
in geographic size to North Carolina than to Texas. Because the
U.S. offshore utility wind energy industry is still in its infancy,
there is no empirical or anecdotal evidence to suggest that those
states' lack of wind-specific siting authority in general, lack of a
military consultation requirement specifically, or identifiable
military activity encroachment concerns have impeded onshore or
offshore wind farm development in any of those similarly situated
states.
Nor is there any apparent movement to close specific military
bases due to encroachment by wind farms or other renewable
energy facilities. But unchecked wind farm encroachment could
have an alternative consequence, which is also undesirable from a
state's perspective. Rather than closing bases, Congress could act
to preempt the states in the field of wind turbine siting altogether.
In her article The Tipping Point of Federalism,2 9 1 Amy Stein
proposes that "[t]he ability of a federal agency to step in and
address the national interest on the margins can create a release
valve to reduce the pressure on Congress to act formally to tip the

287

See, e.g., Losco & Collick, supra note 85, at 236-38 (relating a case study

of wind turbines causing, in the opinion of air traffic controllers, "an immediate
and daunting air safety issue" for Travis Air Force Base, Calif.).
288 See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, supra
note 283, at 6.
289
See, e.g., AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, NORTH CAROLINA WIND ENERGY,
supra note 286, at 1 (reporting North Carolina's offshore potential at 297,456
MW).
290 U.S. Dep't of Def., supra
note 283.
291 Stein, supra note
123.
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balance of power."292 Article 21 C turns this idea on its ear by
inviting the federal agency (in this case the DoD) into the state's
process to act as the release valve. 29 3
From North Carolina's perspective, the merits of implementing
Article 21C's novel consultation requirement can really only be
assessed by ascertaining the extent that its outcomes align with the
state's values. So what are those values? The MLPA's "Legislative
findings" provision 294 expresses the General Assembly's "utmost
concern" over land use that may endanger the military's "future
presence in North Carolina." 295 Article 21C has no findings section
or other expression of legislative intent, but after H.B. 484 initially
passed in the state House of Representatives, an announcement on
Representative Chuck McGrady's web site justified the bill by
noting that "[wdind farms . . . pose a threat to military training
6
programs ....
In the end, Article 21C indicates a value prioritization by North
Carolina: wind energy development may be desirable, but it takes a
backseat to keeping military bases and activity in the state.
Military bases are a known and present value, while wind energy is
in some regards an unproven and not universally favored
technology. 297 To the extent the General Assembly intended this
tradeoff, the new law serves as a reasonable and defensible

292Id. at 271.
293 Under North Carolina's state constitution, the General Assembly
is prohibited
from delegating its legislative authority, but it may enact statutes that delegate to
outside agencies the authority to make fact-finding determinations "upon which
the application of a statute to particular situations will depend." Foster v. N.C.
Med Care Comm'n, 283 N.C. 110, 119, 195 S.E.2d 517, 523 (1973). See also In
re McClain, 741 S.E.2d 893, 896 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (applying the Foster
standard in the context of a state body applying facts determined according to a
federal standard), review denied, 743 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. 2013).
294 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-151.72 (2013). The provision's text is quoted supra
at the text accompanying note 276.
295
296 Id.
PreservingMilitaryReadiness, supra note 230.
297 See supra notes
10-27.
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measure, despite its concession of at least some authority over
siting.
Establishing that the state may properly concede that authority
does not necessarily imply that the DoD can-or should-act on
that concession. The following section assesses the propriety of the
DoD interjecting itself into a state wind farm permitting action at
the level of formality contemplated by Article 21C.
VII. AN UNAUTHORIZED VETO EXERCISED BY A FEDERAL
AGENCY?

In evaluating whether the DoD can properly accept the soft
veto delegated by North Carolina, two considerations are relevant.
The first is whether any U.S. government action in this regard is
consistent with federalism principles. The second is whether the
DoD itself has the authority to accept the delegated power.
Any discussion of the federalism implications associated with
electric generation facility siting must first recognize that, as
explained above, the authority to permit such facilities is a state
function, not a national one. 298 Stein's article examines how
"competing federalism virtues," some supporting centralized
(national) decision-making while others support state or local
control, influence the locus of electric power plant siting
authority. 299 While Stein argues in favor of a shift to centralized
control of electric power resource selection and generation facility
siting, her article presents a well-rounded survey of both sides'
virtues. 300 She lists the following factors that generally favor
decentralized control: an increased opportunity for public
involvement, better accountability, the learning benefit of different
states experimenting with different policies, more effective health
and welfare protections, sensitivity to local cultural concerns, and

298 See supranotes 118-46 and accompanying text.
299 See Stein, supra note 123,
at 247-62.
30 0

Id.
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"diffused power to protect liberty." 30 1 Ideally, any shift from
decentralized to centralized power will not undermine or impinge
on the state or local entity's interests regarding these factors.
Of the decentralization benefits Stein lists, Article 21C most
affects accountability and public access. As an executive branch
agency, the DENR is accountable to the governor,3 02 who in turn is
accountable to the North Carolina electorate. Citizens interested in
wind energy, firms looking to develop wind projects in the state,
and other interested parties can participate in Article 21C's public
hearings as well as exert influence over the state's political
processes. But neither the Clearinghouse nor the DoD is beholden
to local stakeholders in this way.
U.S. government agencies are obligated to adhere to the
federalism principles outlined in Executive Order 13,132
("E.O.").3 03 While E.O. 13,132 is primarily applicable to formal
rulemaking and legislative proposals, it enumerates certain
"Fundamental Federalism Principles" to guide federal agencies:
(a) Federalism is rooted in the belief that issues that are not national in
scope or significance are most appropriately addressed by the level
of government closest to the people.
(b) The people of the States created the national government and
delegated to it enumerated governmental powers. All other
sovereign powers, save those expressly prohibited the States by the
Constitution, are reserved to the States or to the people.
(c) The constitutional relationship among sovereign governments, State
and national, is inherent in the very structure of the Constitution

301 Id. at 257 (internal footnotes omitted) (citing Robert Glicksman & Richard
E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 579, 600 (2008)).
302 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-9 (2013) ("The head of each principal State
department, except those departments headed by popularly elected officers, shall
be appointed by the Governor and serve at his pleasure.").
303 Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999).

52

N.C.J.L. & TECH

[VOL. 16: 1

and is formalized in and protected by the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution .... 304

When the DoD published Part 211's final rule in December
2013, it "certified that [Part 211] does not have federalism
implications, as set forth in [E.O.] 13,132. This rule does not have
substantial direct effects on ... [t]he relationship between the National

Government and the States[,] or [t]he distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of Government."305 As
the regulation was drafted, and as the Clearinghouse is chartered as
described above, that is an accurate certification. But by enacting
Article 21C, North Carolina introduced the chance that the
Clearinghouse could, if it accepts the implied invitation to
participate more directly in a traditionally state-centric process,
affect that distribution of power. This does not invalidate Part 211,
and for that matter does not suggest that it would be expressly
illegal or unconstitutional for the DoD to execute the soft veto. But
from a policy standpoint, these considerations do inform an
analysis of whether that execution would be consistent with
federalism principles.
"Cooperative federalism" refers to collaboration between
national and subnational governments in matters traditionally
reserved to one side of the dual federalism equation.30 6 This
concept is usually understood in the context of power distributed

304 Id. at 43,255-56.
305 Mission Compatibility Evaluation Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,085,
73,088
(Dec. 5, 2013) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 211).
306 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 10, at 1053-1054. The notion
of cooperative
federalism dates back to the New Deal era. See Edward S. Corwin, NationalState Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities, 46 Yale L.J. 599, 601 (1937)
(observing that "[t]he two governmental centers may be envisaged as more or
lessjealous rivalsfor power, or they may be viewed as mutually supplementing
agencies of government") (emphasis in original). More recently, commentators
have used other terms, including "dynamic federalism." See Kirsten H. Engel,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56
Emory L.J. 159, 162 (2006).
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from the federal government to the state or local government,30 7
but less frequently it can describe power transfers in the opposite
direction.30 Either way, its proponents argue that rather than
undermining dual federalism values, cooperative federalism, or
"dynamic federalism" as it is sometimes known, actually protects
those values while also promoting comity and beneficial
redundancy.309 Recognizing the ascendance of this dynamic theory
of federalism allows us to understand Article 21C's consultation
requirement and soft veto element as non-violative of federalism
principles generally. After all, the federal government did not
coerce North Carolina into transferring this power; rather, the state
gave it freely.
This may assuage concerns about the federal government (writ
large) overstepping its bounds were it to act as Article 21C may
allow, but it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary of
Defense, Part 211's "senior officer," or the Clearinghouse can,
within their own statutory and regulatory authority, properly act in
that capacity. NDAA 2011 and Part 211 are ambiguous in this
regard, at best.
The statutes establishing the positions and enumerating the
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, 310 Deputy Secretary of
Defense 3 11 (the "senior officer" under Part 211312), and USD-

See, e.g., Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 10, at 1054 (stating that "[c]ooperative
federalism statutes typically outline the contours of a regulatory program and
empower states to implement the program in accordance with federal
guidelines").
308 See, e.g., Governmental Techniquesfor the Conservation and Utilization of
Water Resources: An Analysis and Proposal, 56 Yale L.J. 276, 299-302 (1947)
(discussing "Delegation of State Powers to other States or to the Federal
Government").
309 Engel, supra note 306, at 176 (citing Robert A. Schapiro, TowardA Theory
ofInteractive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 288 (2005)).
310 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2012).
3 Id. § 132.
312 32 C.F.R. § 211.5(a) (2013).
307
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AT&Lai1 (the "senior official" under Part 211)314 are generally
broad but contain no express or implied authority to intervene in
subnational governmental discretionary functions. 3 15 With respect
specifically to taking advantage of Article 21C's soft veto, NDAA
2011 and Part 211 invite two competing points of view on those
officials' authority.
The first point of view would be that Article 21C's consultation
requirement and all interactions that flow from it (outside of the
coincidental review of any associated FAA Form 7460-1), from the
perspective of the DoD and the Clearinghouse, are nothing more
than a request for an informal review. As discussed above, in
addition to requiring official determinations for all OE/AAA
applications, 3 NDAA 2011 directs the DoD to "establish
procedures for . .. the coordinated consideration of and response to

a request for a review received from State and local officials or the
developer of a renewable energy development or other enery
project . . . and ensure a coordinated Department response .... ."

Likewise, Part 211 expressly contemplates that state or local
officials can request informal reviews. 3 19 If any consultation under
Article 21C is, as this point of view would hold, simply a request
for an informal review, then the Clearinghouse would be acting
within its express authority to respond.32 0
The more compelling point of view is that the nearly inevitable
ramification of an adverse determination-permit denial-transcends

" 10 U.S.C. § 133. The Clearinghouse and its parent entity, the DUSD-I&E, are
subordinate to the USD-AT&L. Office of the Under Sec'y of Def. for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, U.S. Dep't of Def., A T&L Offices, http://www.acq.
osd.mil/offices.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
314 32 C.F.R. § 211.5(b) (2012).
3 See supra notes 310-14.
316 See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text (discussing informal
reviews).
. NDAA 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 358(c)(2), 124 Stat. 4137, 4199 (2011).
31 Id. § 358(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 4199 (emphasis added).
319 See 32 C.F.R. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii)(B)
(2014).
320
id.
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the intuitive scope of an "informal" consultation. Congress
empowered the Secretary of Transportation to report the results of
OE/AAA aeronautical studies in an official capacity to interested
parties.3 2 1 While he or she must allow the DoD to review and
comment on those studies, 322 there is no corollary requirement or
authorization for the Secretary of Defense to report or otherwise
promulgate the results of those review or the comments, including
determinations of unacceptable risk to national security, except to
Congress. 323
Recall also that, with a formal review resulting in a
determination of unacceptable risk to national security, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense (in his or her capacity as "senior officer")
must transmit that final determination to the Secretary of
Transportation. 32432This responsibility is nondelegable.32 5 By contrast,
the Clearinghouse conveys the results of informal reviews to the
requester, whether the requester is a project proponent or a state or
local official.3 26
If an Article 21C consultation were truly only an informal
review request, this distinction would give rise to an irreconcilable
incongruity. For an OE/AAA determination, only the Deputy
Secretary of Defense-the second highest-ranking person in the
department-has the authority to make a final negative
determination and even then may only convey that determination
to a co-equal cabinet department within the federal government.
But for an Article 21C consultation (if it were legitimately an
informal review), personnel at a much lower level in the
bureaucracy (the Clearinghouse) could not only make a negative
determination but also convey that determination to an outside,
sovereign government knowing that it will result in denial of a

321 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(2).
322 Id. § 44718(e).
323 NDAA 2011, Pub. L. No.

111-383, § 358(e)(3), 124 Stat. 4137,4200 (2011).
324 See 32 C.F.R. § 211.6(b)(2)(iii); § 211.6(c)(3).

325 Id. § 211.5(a).
326 Id. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii).
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permit application. This incongruity suggests that, while NDAA
2011 and Part 211 allow for informal engagement, the scope of
that allowance should not extend as far as to allow execution of the
soft veto.
A comparison of the standards defining adverse determinations
under NDAA 2011, Part 211, and Article 21 C also weighs against
a conclusion that Article 21C consultations fall under Part 211's
informal review umbrella. NDAA 2011 seeks to identify projects
that will pose an "unacceptable risk to the national security of the
United States."3 2 7 While Congress did not define that term, Part
211 does, but applies the standard only to formal reviews, not to
informal ones.32 8 Regarding training and operations, the risk must
rise to the level of a "significant" impairment or degradation. 32 9
Article 21C mandates permit denial if the project would "have a
significant adverse impact" on military activities. 330
That both standards invoke the qualifier "significant" is
noteworthy, especially because the standard applicable to informal
reviews only requires the Clearinghouse to ascertain if the project
would cause "an adverse impact." 33 1 There is no requirement that
the impact be "significant" for the Clearinghouse to report it in a
response to request for informal review and use that finding to
initiate mitigation discussions. Only the Deputy Secretary of
Defense can approve the finding of significance common to the
formal review process and Article 21C's standard. Because the
Clearinghouse's informal review determinations are held to a
lower standard, it is reasonable to conclude that neither Congress

See NDAA 2011 § 358(e)(2).
See 32 C.F.R. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii) (2014) (requiring the Clearinghouse to
determine whether "the project will have an adverse impact on military
operations and readiness" during an informal review but not requiring that the
adverse impact be "significant").
329 Id. § 211.2(1).
330
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.120(a)(2) (2013).
33 32 C.F.R. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii).
327
328
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nor Part 211 's drafters intended the informal review process to
serve an end as dispositive as is possible under Article 21C.
So while the federal agency's potential intervention into a state
decision-making process may not run afoul of federalism
principles, in the case of the DoD, such an intervention, at a
minimum, attenuates the federal actors' statutory and regulatory
authorities. Because there has yet to be a formal determination by
the DoD of unacceptable risk to national security under Part 211 or
a permit denial by the DENR under Article 21C, the risks incurred
by this attenuation are speculative. But they may include, for
example, a claim by the project proponent that DoD execution of
the soft veto amounts to a compensable regulatory taking,
especially given the lower standard applicable to informal
-332
review.
The final section of this article will articulate why, if the DoD
implements appropriate safeguards to mitigate the risk of
overreach, North Carolina's Article 21C ought to stand as a model
wind permitting statute, at least for states in which the DoD
maintains a significant installation footprint.
VIII. A MODEL FOR STATES TO EMULATE

In North Carolina, recent experience suggests that military
bases and wind energy development can coexist, even after
implementation of Article 21C. In January 2012 (long before
introduction of H.B. 484), renewable energy development firm

See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978)
(citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)) (noting that government
action "that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate
distinct investment-backed expectations as to constitute a 'taking"'); see also
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013)
(holding that denial of a land-use permit after applicant declined to comply with
conditions disproportionate to public benefit resulted in a taking). Inverse
condemnation claims are difficult to substantiate, and the merits of such a claim
would by nature be case-specific; even a general consideration of this cause of
action is beyond the scope of this article.
332
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Invenergy "abandoned" its plan to construct the Pantego Wind
Energy facility ("Pantego"), comprising forty-nine turbines, in
eastern North Carolina in light of "conflicts between the proposed
wind turbines and low-flying F-15E jets" operating near Seymour
Johnson Air Force Base. 333 Two years later (and after Article
21C's enactment), the Air Force reported that Invenergy agreed to
mitigation including relocating certain turbines to distances no less
than four miles from the centerline of an air route used to access
the Dare County Bombing Range. 334
This success story might have occurred even without Article
21C's mandatory consultation requirement and the threat of its
prohibition on issuing permits for projects that would significantly
impair or degrade military operations. But as Stein points out in
her article, one of the advantages of decentralized regulation is the
opportunity for states to act as public policy laboratories,
experimenting with laws and regulations so that other jurisdictions
may learn from their efforts. 335 With this in mind, other states,
especially those with economies heavily dependent on military
bases, may do well to pay close attention to North Carolina's wind
siting experience under Article 21C. If successful, this statute
could serve as a model not only for wind siting but also for other
forms of development that pose military base encroachment
difficulties.
States not willing to go so far as to concede to a federal agency
a notional veto over its own permitting practices could draft around
3

John Murawski, NewsObserver.com, ProposedPantego Wind Farm Stalls,

NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/01/

12/2600290/proposed-pantego-wind-farm-stalls.html. Pantego also faced opposition
stemming from FWS's assessment that the facility would kill as many as
twenty-one bald eagles each year. Id.
334 Air Combat Command, DOD, Invenergy reach agreement on Pantego
Wind Energy Project (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=
123376558. See also INVENERGY WIND DEV., LLC, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., & U.S.
AIR FORCE, supra note 210, at 1-2 (memorializing the terms of the mitigation
agreement).
335 Stein, supra note 123, at 257.
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that concern. Incorporating balancing language into the permit
standards would accomplish this. For example, the relevant
standard in Article 21C could be amended with the following
italicized language:
(a) Permit Approval. - The [DENR] shall approve an application for a
permit for a proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy
facility expansion unless the [DENR] finds any one or more of the
following:
(2) Construction or operation of the proposed wind energy facility or
proposed wind energy facility expansion would encroach upon or
would otherwise have a significant adverse impact on the mission,
training, or operations of any major military installation or branch of
military in North Carolina and result in a detriment to continued
military presence in the State, to the extent that this detriment would
outweigh the public benefit associated with the proposed wind energy
facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion. In its evaluation,
the [DENR] may consider whether the proposed wind energy facility or
proposed wind energy facility expansion would cause interference with
air navigation routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes,
or radar based on information submitted by the applicant pursuant to
[the permit application requirements], and any information received by
the [DENR] pursuant to [the military consultation requirement]. In
determining whether any detriment to continued military presence
outweighs the public benefit associated with the proposed wind energy
facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion, the [DENR] shall
not substitute any assertions made by the applicant or any outside
organizationfor its own independentjudgment.

This modification would make clear to all parties, especially
the permitting agency, that the DoD's or the Clearinghouse's input
is advisory rather than being a potentially dispositive soft veto.
This is but one possible solution. Non-legislative alternatives may
include drafting administrative rules to eliminate any perceived
ambiguity about the weight of the DoD's input into the state
permitting process.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.120 (2013) (emphasis added to denote this
author's original recommended additional language).
336
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From the DoD's perspective, the North Carolina model
provides reassurance that the wind energy industry's growth will
not outpace the department's ability to protect its training and
operational interests. To avert any actual or perceived attenuation
of authority by the Clearinghouse or the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (acting in the senior officer role), the DoD should
consider revising Part 211 to require state and local governments,
when initiating a review request, to indicate whether the request is
made pursuant to a statutory or regulatory consultation requirement
(like that of Article 21C). If it is, an amended process could require
the Clearinghouse to treat the request as a formal review rather
than an informal one. This would ensure that reviews that may
precipitate a permit denial are vetted with the same rigor and
against the same standard as an OE/AAA review.
IX. CONCLUSION

The potential of wind farms to encroach on military bases and
activities is only one of many competing interests to which state or
local permitting authorities must pay heed. Wind turbines pose a
very real threat to military aviation and other operations. States
hosting military bases are sensitive to the need to expand their
energy resource portfolios without jeopardizing bases that are
important economic engines. This potential conflict is not unique
to North Carolina, but that state has contrived a unique permitting
regime to balance those interests.
As this article has shown, Article 21C raises complex
considerations regarding federalism principles and the virtues of
decentralized control of electricity generation facility siting. And
the potential finality of an adverse determination by officials in the
DoD responding to an Article 21C consultation invites questions
whether such a determination is an overreach.
Each of these issues merits careful consideration, but neither
should be considered fatal to the North Carolina model. The state
must have the latitude to prioritize its interests and legislate based
on those priorities. Article 21C promises to be a worthy
experiment in energy facility siting policy. This Article has shown
that other states with interests similar to North Carolina will be
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well-served to watch the results and be ready to implement or
improve on this model.
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